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Allowing for Greater Admission of Evidence
in NEPA Predetermination Suits
W. Riley Lochridget

INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)1 to ensure that federal, state, and local governments and
their associated organizations coexist in harmony with the environment. 2 It is "our basic national charter for protection of the
environment."3 It is distinct from other areas of environmental
law, which focus on specific activities (such as strip mining or
introducing new chemicals); specific places, flora, or fauna (such
as wilderness areas or endangered species); or the land, water, or
air. 4 By contrast, NEPA broadly aims to "establish[ ] [environmental] policy, set[ ] [environmental] goals, and provide[ ] means
for carrying out [said] policy."5 It aims to structure the governance process in support of environmental values and forces the
government and its agents to adhere to those values when it regulates. 6
To achieve the goal of coexisting with the environment, Congress "requires agencies to consider the environmental consequences of major federal actions that significantly affect the
quality of the human environment."7 Before committing resources to such a project, the agency must perform an environ-

t AB 2002, Dartmouth College; BE, MS 2004, Thayer School of Engineering at
Dartmouth College; JD Candidate 2012, University of Chicago.
1 Pub L No 91-190, 83 Stat 852 (1970), codified at 42 USC §§ 4321-47.
2 42 USC § 4331(a).
3 40 CFR § 1500.1(a).
4 See Nicholas C. Yost, AEPA Deskbook 5 (Environmental Law Institute 3d ed
2003).
, 40 CFR § 1500.1(a) (citations omitted).
6 Yost, AEPA Deskbook at 5 (cited in note 4).
7 Jason J. Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the US. Supreme
Court, Administrative Procedure, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 Stan
Envir L J 3, 4 (2006).
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mental analysis of the effects of their proposed action., Most conspicuously, this requires completion of an environmental impact
statement (EIS). 9 To comply with NEPA, the agency must produce an objective EIS, although it may identify a preferred
course of action while conducting the EIS.10 The agency must
also assess the results by closely examining the EIS "objectively
and in good faith, not as an exercise in form over substance, and
not as a subterfuge designed to rationalize a decision already
made."" Courts have thus held that agencies violate NEPA if
they predetermine their analysis by committing themselves to an
outcome before the process is completed rather than conducting
an EIS prior to making a final decision.12 If a court finds that an
agency has violated NEPA, it may issue a remedy that "fulfill[s]
the objectives of the statute as closely as possible"-a standard
that most frequently results in an injunction. 3
Judicial review of NEPA is governed by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA),14 which establishes that a court should
overturn an agency decision if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 15 A
court requires an agency to take a "hard look" at environmental
consequences in order to demonstrate that its process was not
arbitrary or capricious under the APA.16 This "hard look" doctrine establishes a level of judicial review requiring "agencies to
offer a clear explanation of the weight they give to various factors in the decision-making process."1 7 This standard gives deference to the agency but requires the court to "insure [sic] that the
agency has taken a 'hard look' at environmental consequences
[while assuring that the reviewing court] cannot 'interject itself
within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of
the action to be taken.'" 8
8 Forest Guardiansv United States Fish & Wildlife Service, 611 F3d 692, 711 (10th
Cir 2010). See also 42 USC § 4332(2)(C).
9 42 USC § 4332(2)(C). See also Yost, NEPA Deskbook at 9 (cited in note 4).
10 See ForestGuardians,611 F3d at 713.
11 Metcalf vDaley, 214 F3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir 2000).
12 See, for example, id at 1143-45.
13 EnvironmentalDefense Fund v Marsh, 651 F2d 983, 1005 (5th Cir 1981) (noting
further that injunctions are subject to equity principles).
14 Pub L No 79-404, 60 Stat 237 (1946) (amended 1966), codified in various sections of
Title 5.
15 5 USC § 706(2)(a).
16 See Kleppe vSierra Club, 427 US 390, 410 n 21 (1976).
17 Czarnezki, 25 Stan Envir L J at 14 (cited in note 7).
18 Kleppe, 427 US at 410 n 21, quoting NaturalResources Defense Council vMorton,

458 F2d 827, 838 (DC Cir 1972).
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A circuit split has recently emerged on the question of what
evidence courts may consider when assessing whether an agency
has predetermined its environmental assessment and thus violated its obligations under NEPA. This split implicates not only
NEPA's power to shape agency behavior, but also the general
relationship between courts and federal agencies under the APA.
Specifically, in Forest Guardiansv United States Fish & Wildlife
Service,19 the Tenth Circuit held that courts should "not ignore
relevant evidence that suggests that the agency may have violated the procedures established by NEPA."20 This requires courts
to look at the administrative record in its entirety, rather than
focusing solely on the environmental analysis itself, as the
Fourth Circuit did in National Audubon Society v Department of

the Navy. 2 1
This Comment seeks to establish a framework for deciding
what evidence courts may consider while determining whether a
NEPA environmental assessment has been inappropriately predetermined. Part I provides background on NEPA, its enactment,
and its dual purpose of providing both substantive goals and "action forcing" procedures to realize them. Part II outlines the judicial review of NEPA under the APA's "hard look" doctrine. Part
III discusses the circuit split that has emerged between the approaches of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits regarding evidence
used to decide whether an environmental assessment was predetermined. Part IV advocates adopting the Tenth Circuit's position, which allows for greater admission of evidence by the
courts. Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion.
I. NEPA's DUAL OBJECTIVES
Congress enacted NEPA to ensure that federal, state, and
local governments, as well as public and private organizations,
"use all practicable means and measures ... to create and main-

tain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony."22 In this way, NEPA was meant to serve as the
"basic national charter for protection of the environment."2 3
NEPA seeks to balance a broad range of environmental considerations as well as "other essential considerations of national
1o 611 F3d 692 (10th Cir 2010).
20 Id at 717.
21 422 F3d 174, 198 (4th Cir 2005).
22 42 USC § 4331(a).

23 40 CFR § 1500.1(a).
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The Act requires agencies to integrate environmental
considerations throughout the planning process. 25 To accomplish
this integration, NEPA sets out two related objectives:
"[pireventing environmental damage and ensuring that agency
decisionmakers take environmental factors into account."26
In crafting NEPA, the factor of ultimate importance was the
"link between procedure and substance."2 7 In contrast to the previous patterns of narrow, incremental regulation focused on specific aspects of our environment, 28 NEPA establishes a new, comprehensive framework that reorganizes the government's relationship with environmental considerations. 2 9 The Act's stated
objectives and its congressional record make clear that "Congress
intended to make NEPA more than a procedural paper trail."30
Rather, NEPA seeks to provide improved and harmonious interactions with the environment, while recognizing that "if goals
and principles are to be effective, they must be capable of being
applied in action." 31
Substantively, NEPA's framers intended to "redirect the
goals and policy decisions generated within federal agencies" to
elevate the importance of environmental assets and concerns. 32
Through NEPA, Congress declared a "national policy to guide
federal activities which are involved with or related to the management of the environment or which have an impact on the
quality of the environment." 33 Specifically, NEPA declares a purpose of promoting efforts that "will prevent or eliminate damage
to the environment."34 The Act requires that agencies use "all
practicable means" to achieve these goals. 35
policy."24

24
25
26
27

42 USC § 4331(b).
40 CFR § 1501.1(a).
Yost, NEPA Deskbook at 5 (cited in note 4).
Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The WitheringAway of the
NationalEn vironmentalPolicyAct's Substantive Law, 20 J Land Res & Envir L 245, 253
(2000).
28 See Yost, NEPA Deskbook at 5 (cited in note 4),
29 Lindstrom, 20 J Land Res & Envir L at 247 (cited in note 27).
30 Lindstrom, 20 J Land Res & Envir L at 247 (cited in note 27). See also Calvert
Cliffs' CoordinatingCommittee, Inc v United States Atomic Energy Comnmission, 449 F2d
1109, 1114 (DC Cir 1971) ("Congress did not intend [NEPA] to be such a paper tiger.").
31 Yost, NEPA Deskbook at 6 (cited in note 4), quoting S Rep No 91-296, 91st Cong,
1st Sess 9 (1969).
32 Lindstrom, 20 J Land Res & Envir L at 249 (cited in note 27).
33 Yost, NEPA Deskbook at 5 (cited in note 4), quoting S Rep No 91-296, 91st Cong,
1st Sess 8 (1969).
34 42 USC § 4321. See also Yost, IEPA Deskbook at 5-6 n 12 (cited in note 4), citing
115 Cong Rec 40416 (1969) (noting that NEPA's Senate author, the late Senator Henry
Jackson (D-Wash), explained to the Senate before NEPA's final passage that "[t]he basic
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In terms of procedural changes, the drafters sought to provide policymakers with the ability to overcome the prior gridlock
and fragmentation that consumed many previous attempts at
environmental legislation.36 NEPA required federal agencies to
consider the environmental consequences of major federal actions before it commits resources to a project. 37 To ensure that
the environmental factors remain a part of the agency's process,
the Act established "action-forcing" requirements that generate
information for agency and public benefit and guarantee that
decision-makers give the environmental factors appropriate consideration. 38 Most important among these is the EIS, which obligates an agency to thoroughly consider all potential environmental consequences. 39
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), an organization created under NEPA to report on the quality of the environment in 42 USC H§ 4341-4347, has emphasized the connection between the procedural and substantive goals of the act. Its
binding regulations4 0 state that the primary purpose of the EIS
"is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure [sic] that the policies and goals defined in the Act are infused into the ongoing
programs and actions of the Federal Government."41 The procedural requirements, including the EIS, of "NEPA ha[ve] twin
aims. First, [agencies are obligated] to consider every significant
aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action. Second,
[NEPA] ensures that the agency will inform the public that it
has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process." 42 In the end, the procedure established by
NEPA seeks to operationalize the Act's underlying goal of realizing harmony between government activities and the environment "to the fullest extent possible." 43

principle of th[is] policy is that we must strive in all that we do, to achieve a standard of
excellence in man's relationships to his physical surroundings").

3 42 USC § 4331(b).
36 See Lindstrom, 20 J Land Res & Envir L at 249 (cited in note 27).

3 See ForestGuardians,611 F3d at 711.
3 See Yost, NEPA Deskbook at 6 (cited in note 4).
39 See 42 USC § 4332(2)(C).
40 See Yost, NEPA Deskbook at 7 (cited in note 4) (discussing Executive Order of
President Carter in which CEQ's guidelines became mandatory regulations).
41 40 CFR § 1502.1.
42 Baltimore Gas & Electric Co v NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc, 462 US 87,
97 (1983) (quotations and citations omitted).
43 42 USC § 4332.
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Ultimately, the substantive and procedural goals of NEPA
aim "not to generate paperwork-even excellent paperwork-but
to foster excellent action." 44 The process established by NEPA
requires public officials and decisionmakers to make informed
decisions based upon an understanding of relevant environmental concerns in order to take actions consistent with the Act's
goals of protecting and even restoring the environment. 45
II. JuDIcIAL REVIEW OF NEPA ASSESSMENTS UNDER THE "HARD
LOOK" DOCTRINE
Part II provides background on the judicial review governing
NEPA, which is essential given that the Act places regulatory
obligations on agencies "without apparent means of oversight."46
The Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ) regulations state
that "[t]he President, the federal agencies, and the courts share
responsibility for enforcing the Act." 4 7 Despite this mandate, the
absence of enforcement provisions invites institutional inattention, and "NEPA's enforcement ultimately depends on the
courts." 4 8 Part IL.A looks at the way courts have grappled with
the procedural and substantive requirements of the Act while
ultimately focusing on the former. Part II.B discusses the APA's
requirement that courts take a "hard look" at an agency's decision-making processes. Part II.C discusses the exacting requirements a plaintiff must meet to successfully litigate a charge of
predetermination.
A.

NEPA Litigation in the Courts Has Emphasized Procedural
Requirements

NEPA requires federal agencies planning major federal actions that will significantly affect the environment to create an
EIS detailing "the environmental impact of the proposed action
...
[,] any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
...
[,] [and] alternatives to the proposed action." 49 NEPA thus
establishes specific procedures that agencies must follow before
taking any action and requires the agencies to publicly distribute
their findings regarding the environmental implications of any
44 40 CFR § 1500.1(c).
4 See id.
46 Yost, N/EPA Deskbook at 19 (cited in note 4).
7 40 CFR § 1500.1(a).
48 Id.

49 42 USC § 4332.
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proposed actions.50 Furthermore, NEPA created the CEQ5 1 to
oversee the implementation of the Act and report on the quality
of the environment. CEQ regulations require that decisionmakers "emphasize real environmental issues and alternatives." 52
The first significant decision interpreting NEPA demonstrated that the courts would require agencies to take environmental considerations seriously. In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Commission v United States Atomic Energy Commission5 3 the
DC Circuit found that an EIS that merely "accompan[ied]" an
application through the review process without actually being
considered made a "mockery of the Act." 54 Thus, the Court held
that an agency must engage in an individualized balancing of the
environmental issues raised by weighing them against economic
and technical benefits and taking all alternatives into account.
This balancing makes certain that "each agency decision maker
has before him and takes into proper account all possible approaches to a particular project (including total abandonment of
the project) which would alter the environmental impact and the
cost-benefit balance."55
Subsequent cases-in particular those cases that have
reached the Supreme Court-have emphasized the procedural
nature of NEPA. The Supreme Court has recognized that "NEPA
does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its
mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural."56 The focus on
procedure has led to claims that the Supreme Court and "disinterested" leadership from the Executive Branch have rendered
"NEPA's substantive objectives and declarations for environmental quality legally impotent."5 7 This overwhelming emphasis on
procedure led a former chair of CEQ to describe court and agency
implementation of NEPA as a "near obliteration of substantive
review."5 8

5o Audubon Society, 422 F3d at 184.
51 42 USC § 4341-47.
52 40 CFR § 1500.2(b).
53 449 F2d 1109 (DC Cir 1971).
54 Id at 1117.
55 Id at 1114.
56

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,

435 US 519, 558 (1978).
57 Lindstrom, 20 J Land Res & Envir L at 246 (cited in note 27).
58 Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA's Promise-PartiallyFulfilled, 20 Envir L 533, 534

(1990).
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Strycker's Bay NeighborhoodCouncil, Inc v Karlen 9 is often
cited to support the notion that NEPA is strictly procedural in
nature.6 0 In Strycker's Bay, the Court overturned the Second
Circuit's finding that adverse environmental effects outweighed
the US Department of Housing and Urban Development's selection of a site for a housing facility.6 1 In reaching its decision, the
Court rejected the view that "environmental factors .. . should be
given determinative weight."62 Rather, the Court found that once
an agency has complied with NEPA's procedural requirements
and arrived at a decision, a court may only ensure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences, and it cannot
"interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to
the choice of the action to be taken."63 The Court stated that an
agency was not required to elevate environmental concerns over
other considerations and provided no guidance regarding how
the relevant environmental factors should be addressed. 64
Nine years after Strycker's Bay, the Court clarified its view
that NEPA is procedural in Robertson v Methow Valley Citizens
Council.6 5 It distinguished "[o]ther statutes" that "may impose
substantive environmental obligations on federal agencies" in
finding that "NEPA merely prohibits uninformed-rather than
unwise-agency action."6 6 Focusing on procedure, the Court
found that the "sweeping policy goals announced in § 101 of
NEPA" are realized in the "action-forcing" procedures the Act
lays out, namely an EIS. 6 7 By requiring the preparation of detailed impact statements, the Court found that NEPA will "inevitably bring pressure to bear on agencies 'to respond to the needs
of environmental quality.'" 68 Furthermore, it found that the substantive policy goals were only precatory to NEPA. 69 Thus, Robertson further entrenched the procedural focus of NEPA.

59 444 US 223 (1980).
60 See id at 227. See also Robertson vMethow Valley Citizens Council, 490 US 332,
350 (1989).
st Strycker's Bay, 444 US at 227-28.
62 Id at 227 (quotations and citations omitted).
63 Id at 227-28 (quotations and citations omitted).
64 Czarnezki, 25 Stan Envir L J at 11 (cited in note 7), citing Strycker's Bay, 444 US
at 227.
65 490 US 332 (1989).
66 Id at 351.
67 Id at 350.
68 Id at 349, citing 115 Cong Rec 40425 (1969) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
69 Robertson, 490 US at 349.
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The "Hard Look" Doctrine Provides for a Review of the Substantive Grounds of NEPA Determinations

NEPA litigation takes place under the framework of the
APA. APA § 701(a) states that agency decisions are subject to
judicial review except when a statute forbids judicial review70 or
where "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 1
NEPA does not explicitly prohibit judicial review and thus is subject only to the second exemption, although the Supreme Court
has consistently stated that the "committed to discretion" exception is a narrow one. 7 2 Thus, judicial review of NEPA occurs under the APA's requirement that a federal agency's final decision
may not be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."7 3 This standard provides
general deference to the agency decision but also requires careful
examination of the environmental consequences.7 4
In describing this position, the Court in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park,Inc v Volpe" 5 declared that courts are required to
consider the relevant factors in such a way that its "inquiry into
the facts is to be searching and careful." 76 Courts must assure
that the agencies have "engage[d] in careful consideration of relevant factors in the decision-making process,"7 7 but the Overton
Park Court emphasized that "the ultimate standard of review is
a narrow one. . . . The court is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency."7 8 It is by applying this searching, albeit limited, standard of review that courts comply with
the APA-mandated arbitrary and capricious standard. 9
The Supreme Court clarified its Overton Park decision in
Kleppe v Sierra Club8 by explaining that the role of the courts in
NEPA litigation "is to ensure that the agency has taken a 'hard
§ 701(a)(1)
71 5 USC § 701(a)(2).
72 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,Inc v Volpe, 401 US 402, 410 (1971) (quoting the APA's framers statement that discretion is appropriate only "in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no
law to apply'"). See also Lindstrom, 20 J Land Resources & Envir L at 255 (cited in note
27).
73 5 USC § 706(2)(A).
70 See 5 USC

74 See Kleppe, 427 US at 410 n 21.

7 401 US 402 (1971).
76 Id at 416.

n Czarnezki, 25 Stan Envir L J at 13 (cited in note 7).
78 Overton Park,401 US at 416.

7 See 5 USC § 706(2)(A).
s0 427 US 390 (1976).
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look' at environmental consequences."8 ' This "hard look" review
of the agency's NEPA compliance occurs "within the framework
of normal arbitrary and capricious review" and does not allow for
the court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 82
While maintaining deference to the agency, the "hard look"
doctrine requires that a court carefully review an agency decision. The doctrine emerged from a judicial skepticism of administrative agencies and requires the agency to justify its conclusion
in light of the legal challenge being made. 83 The "hard-look" doctrine contains four principal features: "[a]gencies must give detailed explanations for their decisions; justify departures from
past practices; allow participation in the regulatory process by a
wide range of affected groups; and consider reasonable alternatives, explaining why they were rejected." 84 Thus, "hard look"
demands in-depth judicial review and requires the agency to "accompany its decision with a clear explanation of the factors considered, the weights assigned to them, and the reasons [it] dictated the decision ultimately adopted." 85 This necessitates that
courts closely examine an agency's decision-making process. The
court's scrutiny of the relevant record ensures that the agency's
decision has complied with NEPA's requirement that the environmental consequences be given a "hard look."86
Post-OvertonParkthe Court continued to refine and emphasize the contours of "hard look" review in the context of NEPA
challenges. Notably, in Marsh v Oregon Natural Resources
Council,87 the Court again emphasized the requirement that the
judiciary must generally defer to the informed discretion of the
agency on issues requiring technical expertise but also needed to
carefully assess the record to guarantee that the agency has
made a reasoned evaluation of the relevant factors by "hard look"
review.88 The Court thus affirmed the importance of a thorough
81 Id at 410 n

21.

82 David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme CourtHostile to NEPA? Some PossibleExplanations for a 12-0 Record, 20 Envir L 551, 563 n 53 (1990).
83 See Matthew Warren, Active Judging: JudicialPhilosophyand the Development of
the HardLook Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit,90 Georgetown L J 2599, 2599 (2002) (noting
that "[i]n part, hard look review resulted from pervasive distrust of administrative agencies and the growth of public interest regulation").
84 Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan L Rev 29, 61
(1985).
85 Robert L. Glicksman, A Retreat from JudicialActivism: The Seventh Circuit and
the Environment,63 Chi Kent L Rev 209, 223 (1987).
86 See NaturalResources Defense Council vMorton, 458 F2d 827, 838 (DC Cir 1972).
87 490 US 360 (1989).
88 See id at 376-77.
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analysis of the agency's decisionmaking process while respecting
its holding in Strycker's Bay which cautioned that a court may
not "interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive
as to the choice of the action to be taken."8 9
C.

Predetermination Claims Must Meet a High Bar In Order to
Succeed

An agency violates NEPA when it makes a decision before
analyzing the environmental effects of that action.9 0 The Supreme Court has stated that the required environmental assessments "shall be prepared at the feasibility analysis (go-no go)
stage."91 This timing allows the "assessment [to] 'be prepared
early enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the decision-making process [rather than being] used
to rationalize or justify decisions already made.'"92 While an
agency may have a preferred alternative in mind when it conducts a NEPA analysis, the analysis still "must be timely, and it
must be taken objectively and in good faith."93 A general summary of the doctrine underlying judicial review of NEPA predetermination claims was given by the Tenth Circuit, which stated
that when "an agency predetermines the NEPA analysis by
committing itself to an outcome, the agency likely has failed to
take a hard look at the environmental consequences of its actions
due to its bias in favor of that outcome and, therefore, has acted
arbitrarily and capriciously." 94
A petitioner must meet a high standard for allegations that
an agency has predetermined the outcome of its NEPA analysis
to prevail. 95 Predetermination does not exist "simply because the
agency's planning, or internal or external negotiations, seriously
contemplated, or took into account, the possibilitythat a particular environmental outcome would be the result of its NEPA re-

8
9o
2002)
9'
92

Strycker's Bay, 444 US at 227-28 (quotations and citations omitted).
See, for example, Native Ecosystems Council vDombeck, 304 F3d 886, 892 (9th Cir

Andrus v Sierra Club, 442 US 347, 351 n 3 (1979).
Dombeck, 304 F3d at 892, citing Metcalf v Daley, 214 F3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir
2000). See also 40 CFR § 1502.2(g) (stating that the EIS ought to be "the means of assessing the environmental impact of proposed agency actions, rather than justifying decisions already made"); 40 CFR § 1502.5.
9 Forest Guardians,611 F3d at 712, citing Metcalf 214 F3d at 1142.
9 Forest Guardians,611 F3d at 713.
9 Id at 714.
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view of environmental effects."9 6 Predetermination requires not
simply the contemplation of a preferred outcome, but rather
occurs only when an agency irreversiblyand irretrievably
commits itself to a plan of action that is dependent upon
the NEPA environmental analysis producing a certain
outcome, before the agency has completed that environmental analysis-which of course is supposed to involve
an objective, good faith inquiry into the environmental
consequences of the agency's proposed action.97
Thus, agencies are not required to be completely impartial;
rather they must analyze and prepare the EIS in good faith.9 8
However, this is done with the understanding that "NEPA [ ]
prohibits agencies from preparing an EIS simply to 'justify [ I
decisions already made.'"9 9 The circuits agree on these standards
regarding what constitutes wrongful predeterminations by an
agency under NEPA.100
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT
Part III describes the circuit split regarding what evidence a
court may consider when deciding whether an agency has inappropriately predetermined an environmental assessment under
NEPA. Part III.A outlines the Fourth Circuit's position. Part
III.B discusses the Tenth Circuit's position. Part III.C describes
approaches taken by other circuits in prior cases.
A.

The Fourth Circuit's Position

The Fourth Circuit has held that, when assessing a NEPA
predetermination claim, "court[s] should generally restrict [their]
inquiry to the objective adequacy of the EIS, namely, thorough
investigation of environmental effects and candid acknowledgement of potential environmental harms."10 1 The test's focus on
96 Id at 715. See also Dombeck, 304 F3d at 892-93 (finding that "contemplation does
not amount to a NEPA violation unless [it] ... committed the [agency] to the amendments proposed").
9 ForestGuardians,611 F3d at 714. See also Metcalf 214 F3d at 1143.
98 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc v Corps ofEngineers of the United States
Arny, 470 F2d 289, 296 (8th Cir 1972).
9 Audubon Society, 422 F3d at 199, citing 40 CFR § 1502.2(g).
100 This agreement derives from the text of 40 CFR § 1502.2(g) and can be seen
throughout the cases mentioned here and in Part III.
101 Audubon Society, 422 F3d at 198, citing Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v
Johnson, 165 F3d 283, 288 (4th Cir 1999).
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objective adequacy allows the court to avoid probing into the subjective predispositions of decisionmakers within an agency. Furthermore, it establishes that the test for NEPA compliance is
procedurally focused and "one of good faith objectivity rather
than subjective impartiality." 102
The Fourth Circuit held that confining the evidence considered to the EIS itself was sufficient to determine whether the
agency was simply justifying previously made decisions. 103 It
found that if "an agency has merely engaged in post hoc rationalization, there will be evidence of this in its failure to comprehensively investigate the environmental impact of its actions and
acknowledge their consequences" as required by NEPA. 104 Furthermore, this objective test also enables the court to avoid inquiring into the subjective intent of the agency, which is "a Pandora's box that courts should in most cases attempt to avoid."105
By limiting the scope of the court's evaluation, the Fourth Circuit
hoped to avoid "restrict[ing] the open exchange of information
within an agency" or "frustrat[ing] an agency's ability to change
its mind or refocus its actions."1 06 The court found the latter consideration to be particularly important given that one of NEPA's
goals is to force information into the decisionmaking process that
could alter the final determination.1 0 7 Finally, the court found
that discerning subjective intent was at best a speculative enterprise given that "most federal agencies consist of numerous actors with varying levels of responsibility and different objectives."108 Given these challenges, the court felt the objectives of
NEPA were best met by limiting the evidence considered in predetermination claims to the EIS itself. The weakness of this approach is that it fails to prevent strategic behavior by an agency
that decides its course of action prior to creating the EIS; the
agency can survive judicial scrutiny by carefully drafting the EIS
to appear neutral and avoid discussion of incriminating actions
and decisions.
102 Fayetteville Area Chamber of Connerce v Volpe, 515 F2d 1021, 1026 (4th Cir
1975) (quotations omitted).
10 Audubon Society, 422 F3d at 199.
104 Id.
105 Id at 198.
106 Id.

107 Audubon Society, 422 F3d at 198-99, citing 40 CFR § 1502.1 (stating that the
primary purpose of an EIS "is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in [NEPA] are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the
Federal Government").
108 Audubon Society, 422 F3d at 199.
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The Tenth Circuit's Position

In Forest Guardiansthe Tenth Circuit explicitly denied the
Fourth Circuit's evidentiary limitation requiring the court to rely
solely on the environmental analysis itself.10 9 The court found
that the holding was contrary to its own circuit precedent, which
"looked to evidence outside of the environmental analysis itself."110 The court also noted that its willingness to look beyond
the EIS was supported by precedent in other circuits, in which
courts "ha[d] examined similar evidence, including e-mails, letters, memoranda, meeting minutes, and statements made at a
press conference-as well as the agency's issuance of permits and
entrance into binding contracts-to determine if an agency predetermined the outcome or otherwise acted in bad faith in conducting the NEPA analysis."11 1 For example, despite the lack of
an express statement by the Ninth Circuit as to whether it allows the consideration of internal agency communications when
evaluating predetermination claims, in Native Ecosystems Council v Dombeck"12 it considered a memorandum outside of an EIS
to find that an agency violated the NEPA requirements."13
The Tenth Circuit also provided several policy arguments in
support of its position. Specifically, it expressed a lack of confidence in the belief "that, in every instance, the bias will be evident from the NEPA analysis [itself]."114 The court expressed
concern that "the Fourth Circuit's restrictive approach does not
permit the predetermination inquiry to be conducted with sufficient analytic rigor."115 First the court found that "[tihe purpose
behind NEPA is to ensure that the agency will only reach a deci109 611 F3d at 716.

110 Id. See also Davis vMineta, 302 F3d 1104, 1112-13 (10th Cir 2002) (finding analysis was predetermined after examining meeting minutes and memorandum).
111 Forest Guardians,611 F3d at 717 n 19, citing WildWest Institute v Bull, 547 F3d
1162, 1168-69 (9th Cir 2008); Coalition Against a Raised Expressway, Inc v Dole, 835
F2d 803, 807-08 (11th Cir 1988); EnvironmentalDefense Fund, Inc v Corps ofEngineers
of the United States Army, 492 F2d 1123, 1129 (5th Cir 1974); Western WatershedsProject vBurearu ofLand Management,552 F Supp 2d 1113, 1125-26 (D Nev 2008); Colorado Wild, Inc v United States ForestService, 523 F Supp 2d 1213, 1230 (D Colo 2007);
InternationalSnowmobile Manufacturers Association v Norton, 340 F Supp 2d 1249,
1260-61 (D Wyo 2004); Fund for Animals vNorton, 281 F Supp 2d 209, 229 (DDC 2003).
112 304 F3d 886 (9th Cir 2002).
113 See id at 893 (holding that when the Forest Service contemplates "waiving the
road density standard for [a] timber sale project[ ]," this "does not amount to a NEPA
violation unless the [ memorandum committed the Forest Service to the amendments
proposed").
114 ForestGuardians,611 F3d at 717.
115 Id.

375]

NEPA PREDETERMINATION SUITS

389

sion on a proposed action after carefully considering the environmental impacts of several alternative courses of action."11 6
Thus, to uphold the statute's overarching purpose the court held
that "irrespective of the facial regularity of the agency's NEPA
analysis, we should not ignore relevant evidence that suggests
that the agency may have violated the procedures established by
NEPA."11 7
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit found that extending review
to evidence beyond the environmental analysis would not have
the detrimental effects on agency decisionmaking raised by the
Fourth Circuit.118 The court reasoned that both the chilling effect
on the free exchange of ideas within an agency would not occur
and the objective adjudication of predetermination claims would
be protected "because the evidence must meet the rigorous
standard of establishing that the agency has made 'an irreversible and irretrievable commitment.'"1 1 9 Given the high bar needing to be met for the standard, the court found that employees
would not be discouraged from debating an environmental analysis because an issue would arise only when "those communications fairly could be said to have the effect of binding the agency
(as a whole) to an irreversible and irretrievable commitment to a
course of conduct based upon a particular environmental outcome." 120 Thus, the court concluded "that the Fourth Circuit's
concerns about the detrimental effects on agency deliberations
and the principled adjudication of predetermination claims are
not well-founded." 12 1
Furthermore, Tenth Circuit precedent supported the consideration of evidence beyond the EIS. In Davis v Mineta 22 the
court looked at a memorandum and meeting minutes to find that
predetermination occurred when the private party hired to prepare the environmental assessment was contractually obligated
to issue a finding of no significant impact (FONSI).123 The court
used the materials to find that the public opportunity to comment on an environmental assessment (a precursor to an EIS)

116 Id.
117 Id.
118 ForestGuardians,611 F3d at 717.

119 Id, quoting Metcalf 214 F3d at 1143.
120 ForestGuardians,611 F3d at 717.
121 Id at 718.

122 302 F3d 1104 (10th Cir 2002).
123 Id at 1112-13.
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was merely pro forma. 124 In Lee v United States Air Force25 the
court analyzed multiple agreements between the US Air Force
and the German Defense Ministry to ascertain whether the
NEPA process was inappropriately predetermined. 126
The Tenth Circuit's approach meaningfully upholds the purpose of NEPA. It requires examination of the complete record of
agency action, thus limiting the ability of an agency to strategically avoid the Act's requirements. In so doing, it effectively applies the APA-mandated rigorous examination of NEPA compliance within the agency's decision-making process.1 27
C.

Other Circuits' Approaches

Other courts have consistently considered evidence outside
the EIS in predetermination cases prior to the explicit statements of the Tenth Circuit in Forest Guardians.The fact that
prior trial records have contained information that is beyond the
text of the EIS demonstrates that the approach of the Tenth Circuit in Forest Guardians-despite explicitly creating a circuit
split-is within the accepted bounds of NEPA litigation. It also
demonstrates that consideration of such evidence may occur
without adversely affecting agency functionality, further undermining the Fourth Circuit's concerns.
Other circuits have examined extra-record evidence to determine whether an agency predetermined its NEPA analysis.
While noting that a court's review of agency action is generally
limited to examining certain portions of the administrative record, courts have found that in NEPA cases a court may extend
beyond this "and permit the introduction of new evidence where
the plaintiff alleges that an EIS has neglected to mention a serious environmental consequence, failed adequately to discuss
some reasonable alternative, or otherwise swept stubborn problems or serious criticism . .. under the rug."128
Various circuits have considered a multitude of other resources. For example, the Ninth Circuit has considered evidence
of lobbying efforts of the federal government on behalf of the parties or internal memoranda between agency staff. 129 The Elev124 Id.

125 354 F3d 1229 (10th Cir 2004).
126 Id at 1240.
127 See ForestGuardians,611 F3d at 717.
128 Oregon NaturalResources Council vLowe, 109 F3d 521, 527 (9th Cir 1997) (quota-

tions and citations omitted).
129 See, for example, Metcalf 214 F3d at 1143 (considering international lobbying
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enth Circuit has considered letters, meeting minutes, and various memoranda in NEPA cases. 130 The Fifth Circuit allowed consideration of "two excerpts from letters of the Mobile District Engineer for the [Army] Corps [of Engineers]" as "[t]he most cogent
proof .

.

. offered in support of their thesis of mere [procedural]

formalism." 13 1 Additionally, district courts have often been willing to examine evidence such as e-mails, meeting minutes,
statements at press conferences, letters, and memoranda to ascertain whether an agency predetermined a NEPA analysis. 132
These decisions lend support to the Tenth Circuit's approach,
demonstrating the ability of courts to use extra-EIS evidence and
the effectiveness of doing so.
IV. CONSIDERING EVIDENCE BEYOND THE ENVIRONMENTAL
ANALYSIS ALLOWS FOR EFFECTIVE AGENCY DEBATE WHILE
ADVANCING THE UNDERLYING PURPOSES OF BOTH NEPA AND THE
APA

Predetermination claims under NEPA must be considered in
light of the Act's goals, as well as the judicial record that has
emerged. The general stance of courts, and in particular the Supreme Court, was expressed in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp v Natural Resources Defense Council, InC 13 3 where the
Court held that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive
goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural." 134 Despite this procedural focus, 135 there exist judicial, CEQ, and scholarly interpretations of NEPA that emphasize the centrality of vital substantive goals by Congress that
were to be paired with the Act's procedural mandates. 136 Thereefforts between the US government and the International Whaling Commission prior to
carrying out the environmental assessment); Dombeck, 304 F3d at 892-93 (pointing to an
internal memorandum between Forest Service staff).
130 See RaisedExpressway,835 F2d at 807-08.
131 EnvironmentalDefense, 492 F2d at 1129.
132 See, for example, Watersheds Project,552 F Supp 2d at 1125-26 (examining contract with consultants to project undertaken); Colorado Wild, 523 F Supp 2d at 1230
(allowing plaintiff to include communication between Forest Service's EIS contractor and
the proponent of the project); Snowmobile, 340 F Supp 2d at 1260-61 (considering interagency memorandum and press conference statements); Fundfor Animals, 281 F Supp 2d
at 229-30 (signing of contracts and issuing of permits to third parties considered).
133 435 US 519 (1978).
134 Id at 558.
135 For a detailed discussion of this point, see Part II.A.
136 See Calvert Cliffs, 449 F2d at 1114 (notable judicial focus on dual emphasis). See
also, 40 CFR § 1505.2(b)-(c) (CEQ emphasis of duality); Czarnezki, 25 Stan Envir L J at 9
(cited in note 7) (representative scholarly analysis emphasizing both procedural and sub-
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fore, any proposed solution should seek to emphasize both the
procedural and substantive aims of NEPA. This Comment suggests that courts should follow the Tenth Circuit's holding that
evidence beyond the environmental analysis can be considered in
cases that advance predetermination claims because this approach would be most consistent with upholding the dual aims of
the Act.
Part IV.A outlines the Fourth Circuit's rationale for limiting
the evidence considered in predetermination claims. Part IV.B
explains that the Tenth Circuit's position is consistent with both
the Supreme Court's procedural emphasis towards NEPA and
addresses the Fourth Circuit's concerns given the rigor of its
predetermination standards.
The Fourth Circuit's "Common Sense" Rationale for Restriction of Evidence in Predetermination Claims

A.

The Fourth Circuit in National Audubonl3 7 premised its
holding on the fact that a "court should generally restrict its inquiry to the objective adequacy of the EIS."138 The court found
that an agency takes an appropriate "hard look" when it "obtains
opinions from its own experts, obtains opinions from experts outside the agency, gives careful scientific scrutiny and responds to
all legitimate concerns that are raised."139 To carry out this review, the Fourth Circuit found that "[clourts should not conduct
far-flung investigations into the subjective intent of an agency."140 Instead, courts must continue to guarantee that the test
for NEPA compliance remains "one of good faith objectivity rather than subjective impartiality." 14 1
Furthermore, the court found that this rule was supported
by common sense. 142 Determining "subjective intent in the NEPA
context" represented a Pandora's box that should be avoided by
courts.143 The Fourth Circuit feared that carrying on such an exstantive requirements).
13 422 F3d 174 (4th Cir 2005).
18 Id at 198.

1a9 Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v Johnson, 165 F3d 283, 288 (4th Cir 1999),
citing Marsh v Oregon NaturalResources Council, 490 US 360, 378-385 (1989). See also
Audubon Society, 422 F3d at 198 (finding that the objectivity of the EIS should occur
namely via "thorough investigation of environmental effects and candid acknowledgment
of potential environmental harms").
140 Audubon Society, 422 F3d at 198.
"I
Id (quotations omitted).
142

Id.

143 Id.
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amination "could restrict the open exchange of information within an agency, inhibit frank deliberations, and reduce the incentive to memorialize ideas in written form." 144 Beyond these concerns, a subjective intent inquiry could "frustrate an agency's
ability to change its mind or refocus its actions." 14 5 Overall, given
that an agency is comprised of many individuals, the court found
that discerning a single subjective intent for the entire organization was "a speculative exercise at best."146 Given the challenges
of making such an assessment, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
it was best to constrain the inquiry to only the EIS itself.
B.

The Tenth Circuit's Approach Ensures that NEPA's Procedural Requirements are Met by an Agency and Does Not
Overly Burden Agency Decision-Making

The Tenth Circuit's willingness in Forest Guardiansto look
beyond the EIS to decide whether an agency's decision has been
inappropriately predetermined is consistent with the Supreme
Court's procedural focus in regards to NEPA and the "common
sense" concerns of the Fourth Circuit. Considering evidence beyond the EIS allows a court to remain sensitive to the procedural
focus of NEPA but also provides for a more searching inquiry
into an agency's decisionmaking process as required under the
"hard look" doctrine.
NEPA's procedural provisions require that an agency produce an EIS for any major federal action. 14 7 According to the
CEQ, whose "interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial
deference," 148 the primary purpose of the EIS "is to serve as an
action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined
in [NEPA] are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of
the Federal Government." 14 9 While not requiring an agency to
have no preferred alternative, an agency goes too far if it has
"[1]imit[ed] the choice of reasonable alternatives."1 50 Thus, as described more fully in Part II.C, an agency that uses the EIS pro144 Audubon Society, 422 F3d at 198.
145 Id, citing 40 CFR § 1502.1 (stating that the "primary purpose" of an EIS "is to
serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in [NEPA]
are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government").
146 Audubon Society, 422 F3d at 199.
147 42 USC § 4332(2)(C).
148 Andrus v Sierra Club, 442 US 347, 358 (1979). See also Robertson, 490 US at 35556; Marsh, 490 US at 377.
149 40 CFR § 1502.1.
150 40 CFR § 1506.1(a)(2). See also Audubon Society, 422 F3d at 206.
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cess "to rationalize or justify decisions already made"15 1 does not
comply with the requisite demands of NEPA when conducting
such a (biased) review. The examination of other materials does
not expand the duties of an agency or place greater limitations
upon them; rather, examination of other materials assures that
the agency complies with NEPA's predetermination requirements by providing a court with a more complete view of an
agency's actions and its decisionmaking process. Furthermore,
applying the Fourth Circuit's "common sense" approach would
suggest that evidence beyond the EIS is needed to assure that an
agency cannot avoid compliance by acting strategically and creating an EIS that appears objective, but which only justifies previously made decisions.
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit's concern that examining
materials beyond the EIS will hinder internal dialogue is mitigated by the fact that "the evidence must meet the rigorous
standard of establishing that the agency has made an irreversible and irretrievable commitment." 152 Thus, any recorded debate
between employees would be considered relevant only if "those
communications fairly could be said to have the effect of binding
the agency (as a whole) to an irreversible and irretrievable commitment to a course of conduct based upon a particular environmental outcome, thereby rendering any subsequent environmental analysis biased and flawed." 153 In this way, the rigorous predetermination standard protects both individual and agency concerns that could lead to a reduction in debate by excluding the
vast majority of communication and dialogue from potential
scrutiny. This protection is particularly strong for the lower-level
employees, experts, or scientists whose effectiveness depends on
an ability to freely converse and discuss their findings. Their
opinions, regardless of how vigorously expressed, would not be
able to "effectuate an irreversible and irretrievable commitment
of the agency" given their relatively modest position in the agency. 1 5 4 The Tenth Circuit explicitly recognized this protection of
lower-level employee dialogue, finding such comments, even if
expressed with great force, were not likely to make an otherwise
unbiased environmental review invalid. 15 5 In this way, review of
extra-EIS materials enables a court to conduct the rigorous re151 Metcalf vDaley, 214 F3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir 2000) (citations omitted).
152 ForestGuardians,611 F3d at 717 (citations omitted).
153 Id.
154 Id at 718.
155 See id.
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view demanded by NEPA and the APA while still enabling the
agency to function and communicate effectively.
Beyond providing for more effective agency review, the
Tenth Circuit's approach is not contrary to accepted practice or
precedent in NEPA litigation at all levels of the judiciary. Part
III.C described situations in which courts have considered evidence outside the EIS in predetermination cases prior to the explicit statements in Forest Guardians.With such evidence having previously been admitted to public trial records, it shows that
agencies continue to function effectively even after extra-EIS evidence is considered and made public. Additionally, the high bar
set for plaintiffs to succeed with predetermination claims helps
to insulate the vast majority of agency employees from any possible chilling effect. The Tenth Circuit's approach is thus
strengthened by its consistency with the precedent and practices
of other circuits.
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit's approach to considering
sources outside the EIS most effectively maintains both the procedural and substantive aims of NEPA. By considering a greater
breadth of evidence, a court is able to more effectively conduct a
searching review of the evidence to assure that the agency complies with its NEPA obligations. Even recognizing the potential
harms identified by the Fourth Circuit, precedent and the practice of other circuits demonstrates that utilizing outside sources
would not undercut agency deliberations. Thus, the dual aims of
NEPA are best realized when courts follow the Tenth Circuit's
approach and consider evidence beyond only the environmental
analysis in predetermination cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Through its recent ruling in Forest Guardians the Tenth
Circuit has explicitly created a split regarding what evidence a
court may consider when deciding if a NEPA-required environmental analysis has been predetermined. While other circuits
have considered evidence outside of the environmental analysis,
they have never explicitly stated which evidence will be considered, as have the Fourth and Tenth Circuits. Adopting the Tenth
Circuit's position and allowing for evidence outside of the EIS
enables courts to conduct a thorough, searching analysis, as required under the APA's "hard look" doctrine. That approach is
consistent with the Supreme Court's procedural focus for NEPA
while allowing courts to ensure that agency procedures are consistent with the underlying substantive goals of the Act. Ulti
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mately, this approach allows the courts to enforce the dual goals
of NEPA: preventing environmental damage as well as assuring
that agency decisionmakers take environmental factors into account and are well informed. By allowing for more rigorous oversight by courts the Tenth Circuit approach more effectively monitors each agency, while still protecting the agency's executive
power and independence.

